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This paper describes and analyzes the results of a unique ﬁeld experiment especially
designed to test the eﬀects of the level of commitment and information available to
individuals when sharing risk. We ﬁnd that limiting exogenously provided commit-
ment is associated with less risk sharing, while limiting information on defections
can be associated with more risk sharing. These results can be understood by
distinguishing between intrinsic and extrinsic incentives, and by recognizing that
social sanctions are costly to inﬂict or that individuals suﬀer from time-inconsistent
preferences. Comparing the groups formed within our experiment with the real life
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experiment and suggests that the results are salient to our understanding of risk
sharing arrangements observed in developing countries.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: C93; D71; D81; O12.
Key Words: Field experiment; risk sharing; social sanctions; insurance; limited
commitment; asymmetry of information.
We are grateful for comments by seminar participants at the Centre for the Study of
African Economies at Oxford University, the DRG at the World Bank, the Univer-
sity College London, Sussex University, Boston University and the NEUDC. We also
thank the editor and three anonymous referees for useful comments on an earlier draft.
Barr’s research was funded by the Department for International Development under
ESCOR grant number R7650. Genicot is also grateful to MIT for their hospitality
during the preparation of the current version. Please address all correspondence to
Abigail.Barr@economics.ox.ac.uk and gg58@georgetown.edu.1
1. Introduction
Over four ﬁfths of the world’s population do not have access to formal insur-
ance against income and consumption shocks (Holtzmann, Packard, and Cuesta,
(2000)). In response to the large ﬂuctuations in their income, people often rely on
informal loans and transfers to smooth consumption. Eﬃciency would require that
individuals be insured against all idiosyncratic shocks. Within a community, this
means that variations in an individual’s consumption should be fully explained by
variations in aggregate income, and not by individual income shocks. This pre-
diction has been the foundation for most of the empirical tests of risk-sharing in
the literature. From these empirical studies we have learnt that full risk pooling is
rare (e.g., Ravallion and Dearden (1988), Morduch (1991), Ravallion and Chaud-
huri (1991), Alderman and Paxson (1992), Townsend (1994)), that some types
of shocks are more likely to be informally insured than others, that risk pooling
is associated with certain types of relationship (e.g., Grimard (1997), De Weerdt
(2002), Fafchamps and Lund (2003), Dekker (2003)), and that allowing for history
dependence in a model of risk-sharing without commitment better ﬁts the data
(Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (2002)).
Informal risk-sharing arrangements are potentially limited by the presence of var-
ious incentive constraints, with asymmetries in information and the lack of com-
mitment – the fact that these arrangements have to be self-enforcing - receiving
particular attention. A recent and growing theoretical literature investigates in de-
tail how these factors constrain the risk sharing arrangements that people can en-
gage in (e.g., Coate and Ravallion (1993), Fafchamps (1998), Kocherlakota (1996),
Genicot and Ray (2002), Ligon (1998)). However, few empirical studies have aimed
to directly identify the eﬀect of such factors on the eﬃciency of the risk sharing
arrangements that people enter into. The diﬃculty lies in measuring the possible
asymmetries of information and the extent of commitment available to individuals.
Moreover, following Platteau (1994a, 1994b), Fafchamps (1992, 1996), Posner and
Rasmusen (1999), Kreps (1997) and others, it is important to acknowledge that
both extrinsic incentives, especially sanctions that can credibly be threatened, and
intrinsic motivations, such as altruism, inequality aversion and reciprocal kindness,
can act as bases for commitment. Kinship, co-ethnicity, shared clan membership,
and religious co-aﬃliation are all statistically associated with ﬂows of assistance
(Grimard (1997), De Weerdt (2002), Fafchamps and Lund (2003), Dekker (2003)),
but is this because such relationships facilitate the eﬀective use of extrinsic incen-
tives (via greater observability, for example) or because they are associated with
relationship-speciﬁc forms of intrinsic motivation? Surprisingly little attention has
been paid to the distinction between intrinsic motivations and extrinsic incentives
in the risk sharing literature. A notable exception being Foster and Rosenzweig2
(2001) who show that altruism could actually reduce transfers in the presence of
limited commitment. This result and the growing experimental evidence that ex-
trinsic incentives can crowd out intrinsic motivations and thereby reduce rather
than increase cooperation (Cardenas, Stranlund, and Willis (2000), Bohnet, Frey,
and Huck (2001)) highlight the importance of distinguishing between the two.
This paper describes and analyzes the results of a unique ﬁeld experiment es-
pecially designed to test the eﬀects of changes in the level of commitment and
information available to individuals when entering into risk sharing arrangements.
The experiment was run in a number of Zimbabwean villages, the inhabitants of
which are known to engage in risk sharing arrangements in real life. Within the
experiment, subjects were asked to take part in a gambling game and invited to
form risk sharing groups that pool and share the gains from their gambles under
three treatments that varied with respect to the level of exogenous commitment
– the ease with which individuals could opt out of their group or “defect” after
learning the realization of their own gamble – and whether information on such
defections was public or private. We ﬁnd that: (1) when full commitment is exoge-
neously provided, individuals engage in substantial risk sharing and make choices
that are more risky and more proﬁtable than when this exogenous commitment
is limited; and (2) under limited exogenous commitment, less risk sharing occurs
when defections are public than when they are private. Result (1) suggests that ex-
ogenous source of commitment is valuable to these villagers, which in turn implies
that their intrinsic motivations and the commitment they can maintain through
social sanctioning are not suﬃcient to guarantee full risk sharing. Result (2) seems
at ﬁrst counter-intuitive. That the level of information on defections revealed in
the game aﬀects risk sharing suggests that social sanctions matter. However, we
would have expected that more information on defections would result in greater
sanctioning possibilities and hence more rather than less risk sharing. We provide
two possible explanations for this result. If punishment is costly, it is possible that,
although defections are less likely when they must be executed publicly, individ-
uals will choose not to participate in risk sharing groups in order to avoid such
costs. Alternatively, individuals might worry about being tempted to defect and
attract public sanctions and shame when defection is public. If they prefer not
to be tempted and sanctioned ex-ante or know they will suﬀer regret if they are,
they may choose not to engage in risk sharing arrangements. These mechanisms
are explained in detail in Section 4.
Our results may also be relevant for the growing experimental literature on pun-
ishment and social sanctions in public good games. Rege and Telle (2004), for
instance, ﬁnd that contributions to the public good increased signiﬁcantly when
subjects contribute publicly as opposed to anonymously. However, in most public
good games groups and the availability of sanctions are given. But, when subjects3
vote on the possibility of sanctions or rewards, Sutter, Haigner and Kocher (2007)
ﬁnd that subjects prefer the latter even when the former would be more eﬀective.
We ﬁnd that a framed ﬁeld experiment played face-to-face by fellow villagers –
in contrast with anonymous laboratory-based experiments – is particularly well
suited to our purpose.
1 First, we are interested in observing villagers decision-
making behaviour in a context that is suﬃciently close to real life so as to be
recognisable to them.
2 Second, our ﬁeld experiment imposed enough control to
allow us to exogenously inﬂuence the two environmental factors of interest, com-
mitment and information on defections, and create measures of risk sharing and
risk taking needed for the analysis, while leaving the villagers as free as possible to
make decisions based on the considerations they might usually take into account.
Hence, from their behavior in the experiment, we learn about the characteristics
of their environment and the risk sharing arrangements that they make in real life.
Finally, it allows us to compare, for a subset of villages, the risk sharing groups
formed within the context of the experiment with risk sharing networks in real life.
Using a non-parametric procedure, we show that in four out of the ﬁve villages the
experimental and real risk sharing networks were signiﬁcantly related. This gives
us some conﬁdence in the external validity of the experiment.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a detailed
description of the experimental design. Section 3 presents a stylized model of
the experiment. Section 4 then presents the analysis of the data and Section 5
expands on the possible explanations for our results. A description of the data
used to investigate the external validity of the experiment and the results of the
test are presented in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2. Experimental Design
The following experiment was designed to examine how diﬀerent levels of commit-
ment and information aﬀect risk-sharing and risk-taking. Subjects participate in
two rounds of an experiment separated by one day. During Round 1, subjects play
individually. Each subject is called separately and asked to choose one out of six
gambles that vary in average return and riskiness. Each earns the realized gain
from the chosen gamble. In Round 2, individuals are again called separately one
by one and oﬀered the same choice of gambles. However, prior to choosing and
1According to Harrison and List (2004), our experiment is ‘framed’ because the villagers were
required to make decisions about whether and how to interact not with anonymous others but
face-to-face with their fellow villagers. And, this being the case, information gleaned during their
everyday lives would have been relevant to their decisions.
2Post play discussions indicated that the villagers saw the parallels between the game and aspects
of their everyday lives choosing crops with diﬀerent yields and levels of risk, helping each other
out if and when crop choices proved erroneous.4
depending on the treatment being applied to their village, subjects are given the
option of forming risk sharing groups. Each participating village was randomly
selected into either a control sample or one of three treatment samples. Under
the control, C, subjects play individually again: their Round 2 is identical to their
Round 1. In contrast, under the ﬁrst treatment, Treatment 1 (T1), the villagers
are invited to form risk sharing groups with full commitment. Villagers under
Treatment 2 (T2) and Treatment 3 (T3) can also form risk sharing groups, but
with limited commitment: in both cases, subjects can if they wish opt out of their
groups after learning the outcome of their gambles. The information on such de-
fections is public in T3 and private in T2. Notice that in none of the treatments
do subjects observe each other’s choice of gamble or outcome.
Below, we describe these decision making environments, i.e., the choice of gambles
and the risk-sharing technologies under each treatment, in more detail. However,
ﬁrst, we introduce our experimental subjects.
The subjects. Our experiment involved over 600 inhabitants from 23 Zimbab-
wean villages located in three diﬀerent areas of the country. Some of these villages
were formed in the 80s as a result of land redistribution. The inhabitants of these
resettled villages are less likely to be related to each other by blood. However,
their villages tend to be geographically denser and have been shown to engage in
more associational activity (see Barr 2004). For these reasons, we will control for
the type of village in the analysis.
The day before the experiment started in each of the selected villages, each house-
hold was visited and invited to send an adult of a speciﬁc gender to be a subject
in our experiment. Whether a man or a woman was requested was randomly
determined, although if none of the speciﬁed gender was present, the other was
acceptable. They were told that, preferably, their representative would be either
the household head or their spouse as these are the principle decision-makers in
the households.
On the next day, the subjects were called to a meeting, having been told that
this was to be the ﬁrst of two meetings to be held on consecutive days. Once the
research team had been introduced, each subject met one of four research assistants
(RAs) in private. They were taught the gamble choice game (described next), their
comprehension was tested, and then they played. After being paid, they were asked
to sit separately from those who had not yet played to await further instructions.
Tea and snacks were served. Once everyone had played Round 1, Round 2 of the
experiment – to be played on the next day – was explained. They were told that
they would play the gamble choice game again and, depending on their treatment
category, the rules relating to the risk sharing groups that they could form.5
In total, 640 subjects attended Round 1 of the experiment in their village. Of
these, 22 did not show up for Round 2 because they had been called away on
unforeseen business. Each of these sent another member of their household in
their stead. The absentees were more likely to be household heads and were also
older and more likely to be male as a result.3 Since household headship is not
found to be signiﬁcant in any of our analyses, any sample attrition bias is likely to
be insigniﬁcant.
In addition, to the replacements, two households sent representatives to Round 2
who had not sent anyone to Round 1. Thus, a total of 664 subjects were involved
in the experiment, although only 642 took part in the more interesting Round 2
and only 618 took part in both Round 1 and Round 2.
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics on the subjects. In Round 2, forty-
eight percent of our subjects were female, 69 percent were married, 40 percent
were heads of households. The average age was 42 years and, on average, they
had 7 years of education. Eighty-three percent lived in resettled villages and the
samples from each of the three areas were similar in size.
To look at the representativeness of our sample, in Table 1, we compare the mean
characteristics of the experimental subjects with those of the adult (over 15 year
old) population in the same villages as indicated by a survey that took place
earlier in the same year. Given our recruitment strategy, it is not surprising that
household heads and their spouses are overrepresented in our sample. This also
explains why our subjects are older and more likely to be married. Women are
slightly underrepresented, despite our eﬀorts to ensure a 50:50 split. We think this
is because the recruiting RA mentioned that money could be won and this gave
the household heads an incentive to turn up at the games themselves.
The gamble choice. The gamble choice game that individuals play in both rounds
of the experiment goes as follows. Each subject i is called to a private meeting
with an RA and asked to choose one gamble `i out of six gambles oﬀered L ≡
{A,B,...F}. Every gamble ` ∈ L yields either a high payoﬀ ¯ y` or low payoﬀ y
` each
with probability 0.5. Whichever gamble was chosen, the payoﬀ was determined by
playing a game that involved guessing which of the RA’s hands contained a blue
rather than a yellow counter. We denote as yi(`i) i’s realized gamble gain. If the
subject found the blue counter she received the high payoﬀ associated with the
gamble of her choice, ¯ y`i. If she found the yellow counter, she received the low
payoﬀ associated with that gamble, y
`i.
The six gambles (taken from Binswanger (1980)) are presented in Figure 1, the
chart used to present the gambles to the subjects, many of whom were illiterate.
3Detailed descriptive statistics are available from the authors upon request.6
Each gamble ` ∈ {A,B,...F} is depicted as two piles of money, the high payoﬀ (¯ y`)
on a blue background and the low payoﬀ (y
`) on a yellow background.
Table 2 presents the expected returns on each gamble, which vary from 100 to 200
Zimbabwean dollars, and their variances, which lie between 0 and 200 Zimbabwean
dollars. At the time of the experiment, one day of casual labour would have earned
a villager approximately 200 Zimbabwean dollars, moreover such work opportuni-
ties were scarce. 4 Hence, the stakes are substantial and it is reasonable to expect
individuals to exhibit risk aversion.
5
Finally, Table 2 presents the intervals of constant relative risk aversion implied by
an individual choosing each of the six gambles oﬀered and whose only source of
consumption expenditure is the gamble payoﬀ.
The Treatments. After all the villagers had played Round 1 of the gamble choice
game, they were given detailed verbal instructions regarding Round 2, to be played
on the following day, and provided with copies of Figure 1 to aid any discussions
they wished to hold. Round 2 of the experiment diﬀered across villages depending
on their treatment category.
Control. In three randomly selected villages, the subjects were told that during
the meeting scheduled for the next day, they would be playing the same game once
again. This serves as a control, referred to as C below.
In all other villages, people were given the option of forming ‘sharing groups’ before
taking part in Round 2 of the gamble choice game. That is, in each village I of n
inhabitants, the latter could partition themselves into sharing groups S1,...Sm of
any size (including singletons). These groups had to be exhaustive and mutually
exclusive ∪j=1,..mSj = I and Sj ∩ Sk = 0 for k 6= j. The extent to which commit-
ment to the sharing group was exogenously enforced and information relating to
defections made public varied by treatment.
Treatment 1. In eight randomly selected villages, Treatment 1 – referred to as
T1 below – provided the subjects with a risk sharing technology exhibiting full
commitment. Within a sharing group, all individual winnings from the Round
2 gamble choice game were automatically pooled and divided equally among the




4During the experiment, the average earnings were 158 and 172 Zimbabwean dollars in Rounds
1 and 2 respectively. At the time of the experiment, the oﬃcial exchange rate was around 55
Zimbabwean dollars to one US dollar and, according to data collected by the researchers, the
parallel market rate was approximately 2.5 times the oﬃcial rate.
5See Rabin (2000) for why expected utility implies that individuals should not reveal their risk
aversion when stakes are small relative to their average consumption.7
These rules and the monetary implications of sharing-group-formation were ex-
plained to the villagers with the aid of simple examples.
In contrast to T1, in Treatment 2 and Treatment 3 the degree of exogenous com-
mitment inherent in the rules of the game was limited.
Treatment 2. In six villages (randomly selected), having been told that they
could form sharing groups, the subjects were told that they could, if they wished
opt out of their sharing groups in secret. They could decide whether to stay or to
opt out after learning the outcome of their own gamble (but without knowing the
choice or outcome of others’ gambles) and while alone with an RA. Subjects who
defected in this way received the gain from their own gamble as their payoﬀ, while
the rest of the gains within the group were pooled and divided equally between
the remaining group members. Under this treatment, T2 below, commitment was
limited and information was asymmetric. Subjects may have been able to draw
some inferences about defections. However, ex-post, subjects could never have
been certain that someone had opted out and, in groups of three or more, about
whom to suspect of foul play.6
Treatment 3. Finally, in the remaining six villages, the subjects were told that
they could publicly opt out of their sharing groups. After learning the realization
of their own gamble, when alone with an RA, they could decide to opt out of their
sharing group but only if they were prepared to conﬁrm their defection publicly
in front of all the villagers present at the experimental session once everyone had
completed their Round 2 gamble choice game. Under this treatment, T3 below,
commitment is limited but there is no asymmetry of information regarding the
defections.
The second round payoﬀs to any treatment can be represented as follows. For all
subjects i = 1,..n, let di be an indicator that takes the value 1 if i stays in the
group she joined and 0 if she defects. For subjects under C and T1 as well as






if di = 1
di = 0.
Measures of risk sharing and risk taking. In our analysis, we focus on three
measures of the amount of risk sharing and risk taking that the subjects undertook
during the experiment. The ﬁrst is whether the subjects joined a risk sharing group,
the second is the size of the risk sharing group they joined, and the third is the
riskiness of their choice of gamble in Round 2. Ceteris paribus, if the members of
6Consider a group of 2 for instance. A subject whose payoﬀ is diﬀerent from her gamble gain
would be sure that the other stayed. However, if a subject’s payoﬀ equals her gamble gain, it is
possible that the other opted out or that he picked the same gamble and had the same outcome.8
a sharing group select riskier gambles, they can be said to be pooling more risk in
order to secure a higher expected return. By comparing these three measures across
treatments we can investigate the eﬀects of limited commitment and asymmetric
information on risk pooling.
3. Model
In this section, we present a stylized model of the experiment that will help us
interpret the results. Some readers may prefer to skip this section and return to it
after reading Section 4 which describes the results of the experiment.
We can distinguish between three possible sources of commitment, two relating to
extrinsic incentives and one to intrinsic motivations. First, there is the exogenous
extrinsic commitment technology provided by the game. This exogenous commit-
ment is full under T1 and limited under T2 and T3.7 Second, there is endogenous
extrinsic commitment which relates to the punishments or social sanctions that
others might inﬂict on group members who defect by opting out of their group (for
instance, excluding the culprit from social or economic interactions).8 Below, fi
denotes the total value of these punishments to the punished individual i. This
includes the value of any current punishment as well as any diﬀerence in i’s future
utility due to retaliation. We denote by cj,S the cost to j of punishing a set of
individuals S. Finally, as emphasized in the experimental literature, intrinsic mo-
tivations such as guilt, altruism, inequality aversion and reciprocal kindness, can
act as bases for commitment. To capture intrinsic motivations in a simple way,
we shall denote the loss of utility that i would feel, due to such motivations, if she
defects on a group S of fellow villagers as gi,S. These last two sources of commit-
ment could sustain a substantial level of risk sharing under T2 and T3, although
clearly the potential for social sanctions is greater under T3 where information on
defections is public.
Let νi(S) be the utility that i expects from being in a group S, given her beliefs
over what will happen and the characteristics of the other group members. Irre-
spective of the process of group formation in the villages under treatments T1 to
T3, stability requires the following: there should be no individual i belonging to
7Subjects can opt out from their groups but, in contrast with the models of risk sharing with no
commitment, group members do not observe the outcome of others’ gambles prior to deciding
whether to opt out and, if they stay in the group, the payoﬀs from the gambles are split equally.
8In experiments, Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2000), Bowles, Carpenter and Gintis (2001), Mas-
clet, Noussair, Tucker and Villeval (2003), and Carpenter and Seki (2004) for instance show that
social or shame-based sanctions can be used to enhance commitment and that such sanctions are
commonly threatened and applied.9
group S, while there exists another group S0 such that
νi(S
0 + i) > νi(S),
and
νj(S
0 + i) ≥ νj(S
0) for all S
0 6= ∅,j ∈ S
0.
In particular, this implies that the individual participation constraints must be
satisﬁed, i.e. group members must prefer being in a group than on their own.
Control. Under C, subjects participate in the Round 2 gamble choice game in-
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Treatment 1. Under T1, subjects can form sharing groups with full exogenous
commitment. The choice of gamble for the members of a given group should now
be an equilibrium. Consider a group S of size s. We denote by σi a strategy for













where Eσ represents the expectation on the gamble gain given the strategies. For
σ∗(S) ≡ {σ∗












In an equilibrium σ∗, i’s expected utility is
ν
T1
i (S) = Ui(σ
∗,S).
This formulation is based on two implicit assumptions. First, group members
do not coordinate their gamble choices and so neither suﬀer nor expect to suﬀer
any punishment for their choice of gamble. And second, other group members’
preferences, in particular with respect to risk, are fully known.9
Under this treatment group formation has two interesting eﬀects on the choice of
gamble. First, the riskiness of the gambles chosen by diﬀerent members of the same
group may be strategically complementary and so multiple equilibria may exist.
Second, on average, we expect the subjects in any one group to select more risky
gambles than they would alone. However, this does not need to be the case at the
9It would be easy to relax this assumption and include some uncertainty with respect to others’
choice of gamble.10
individual level. Indeed, in equilibrium, a risk averse group member who suspects
that other members will pick very risky gambles may select a safer gamble than
he would if playing alone. Finally, note that heterogeneous individuals would not
necessarily form the largest group possible. This is due to expected diﬀerences in
their preferred gambles. For instance, a subject with very low risk aversion may
not want to be in a group with a highly risk averse subject who would choose a
safe gamble with low expected return.
Treatment 2. Under this treatment, subjects can secretly opt out of their sharing
groups after learning the outcome of their gambles. Defectors receive the gain from
their own gamble as their earnings, while the remaining group members share the
sum of their gains equally. The latter may be able to draw some inferences about
the likelihood that someone has defected from their earnings. However, they cannot
infer with certainty that a defection has occurred, and cannot identify a speciﬁc
defector in groups of three or more. Subjects who defect do not learn anything from
their earnings. Moreover, other villagers would not know of the defection. Hence,
under this treatment, there is very little extrinsic commitment, either exogenous or
endogenous: defections are allowed and the likelihood of detection and punishment
is limited. Punishments could be imposed based on inferred likelihoods of defection.
However, we make the simplifying assumption that this does not occur.10 So,
under T3 we assume that only intrinsic motivations prevent subjects who win
their gambles from opting out of their sharing groups.
Consider a group S. Let ei represent i’s realized earnings at the end of the game
if she stays in the group and let E be the set of possible values for ei: the set
of averages of all possible subsets of y for all possible realizations of y. For all
e ∈ E, we denote as πi(e|yi,S) the probability that individual i assigns, given her
realized gamble gain yi, to earning e if she stays in the group. These probabili-
ties reﬂect individual i’s expectations about other members’ gamble choices and
realized outcomes, as well as over the likelihood that they defect.





while if i defects she would get utility
v
D
i (S,yi) = ui (yi) − gi,S.
10Note that since the rest of the community, i.e., those not in the defectors group, do not know
of the defection, punishment itself may be more diﬃcult to enforce as it is costly.11
Assuming that indiﬀerent subjects do not defect, individual i stays in the group if
(2) gi,S ≥ e gi,S(yi) ≡
X
e∈E
πi(e|yi,S)(ui (yi) − ui (e))
and defects otherwise. For any subject i in group S, let di(yi) = 1 if i stays – the
above inequality holds – and 0 if she defects.
Assume that uncertainty concerning others’ behavior relates to their intrinsic mo-
tivations g. Let Γij(g) be the distribution of i’s beliefs on gj,S. If all types of gj,S
participate, then
γij(yj) ≡ 1 − Γij (e gj,S(yj))
is the probability that j stays if his income is yj as assessed by i. These probabilities
enter into i’s expectations πi.













and individual i’s choice of gamble `i will maximize Ui(S,`i) evaluated at the
equilibrium gamble choice for other members of each type.
So, in contrast to T1, under this treatment individuals’ expectations regarding
others’ intrinsic motivations will aﬀect their group formation decisions. Unless
intrinsic motivations are and are believed to be suﬃciently high, individuals will
be less likely to join risk sharing groups. In addition, if others opt out with some
positive probability, the insurance value of a group is reduced. Hence, subjects
may not choose more risky gambles. Notice that, in general, an individual who
plans to opt out of her group will choose a riskier lottery than an individual who
plans to stay upon winning. This is because having to share one’s winnings with
some probability reduces the marginal utility from a high winning.
Treatment 3. Under T3, subjects can opt out of their sharing groups after learn-
ing the outcome of their gamble, but only if they are prepared to conﬁrm their
defections in front of all the villagers present in their experimental session. Ex-
ogenous extrinsic commitment is limited in this treatment. However, there is no
asymmetry in information regarding defections. So endogenous extrinsic commit-
ment based on punishment in the form of social sanctions is more likely than under
T2.
For each i ∈ S and e ∈ E, we denote as ρi(e|y,S) individual i’s assessment of the
probability of earning e, given her own gamble gain realization y, if she stays in
the group S. As earlier, these probabilities reﬂect individual i’s beliefs regarding
others’ gamble choices and realized outcomes, as well as the probability that they12
defect. Moreover, we let αi,S0 be the probability that i gives to the likelihood that
a subset S0 of S \ i stays.11









If i defects then she would get utility
v
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Notice that this formulation assumes that sanctions are carried out by everyone,
including other defectors. This is the case in an equilibrium in which individuals
who fail to carry out a punishment would themselves be sanctioned by the other
group members and possibly by others in the community (recall that information
on defections is public information).
Hence, i stays in group S if
(3) gi,S ≥ b gi,S(yi) ≡
X
e∈E
ρi(e|yi,S)(ui (yi) − ui (e)) − fi,S
and defects otherwise. Let di(yi) = 1 if i stays – the above inequality holds – and
0 if she opts out.
Given Γij(g), the distribution of i’s beliefs over gj,S, if all types of gj participate
then
αij(yj) ≡ 1 − Γij (b gj,S(yj))
is the probability that j stays if her income is yj as assessed by i. These probabilities
enter into ρi.













If she participates, individual i chooses `i to maximize Ui(S,`i) given the equilib-
rium choice of other members of all possible type.
Under T3, the group selection process is aﬀected not only by individuals’ expecta-
tions regarding others’ intrinsic motivations but also by their capacity to sanction
others. With sanctions being easier to implement, since defections are common
11This accounts for the probability of any particular gamble realization and the probability of
defection following each realization.13
knowledge, group members should be less likely to opt out under T3 than T2.
And if social sanctions are suﬃciently strong to deter all defections, their cost will
be irrelevant and the outcomes should be similar to T1.
4. Results
We now turn to the results of the experiment.
Defections. Do subjects opt out when exogenous extrinsic commitment is lim-
ited? Before turning to the analysis of risk sharing, it is useful to look at defections
in the two treatments under which they were possible. Caution is required here as
subjects could only defect if they were socially selected into a sharing group and
subjects are less likely to be selected if they are expected to defect. Simple descrip-
tive statistics will reﬂect this selection process as well as the subjects’ subsequent
defection decisions.
Figure 2 describes the decisions made by those subjects that joined groups under
T2 and T3. Under T2, 64 of 157 subjects joined sharing groups. Of these, 32 won
high payoﬀs on the gambles of their choosing and of these 7 (22 percent) opted out
of their sharing groups in secret. All of the subjects who won low payoﬀs stayed
in their groups. Under T3, 66 of 183 subjects joined sharing groups. Of these
34 won high payoﬀs on the gambles of their choosing and of these only one (3
percent) opted out of her sharing group in public. Again, all of the subjects who
won low payoﬀs stayed in their groups. The observation that only subjects who
won their gambles decided to opt out suggests that they understood the game and
the consequences of their actions.
The proportion of defections among high payoﬀ winning group members diﬀers
signiﬁcantly (ﬁve percent level) between the treatments, being lower when the
defections had to be conﬁrmed publicly. This suggests that either subjects who
are more likely to defect are less likely to be selected into groups under T3 or
group members are deterred by social sanctioning when information on defections
is public or both.
Group formation. Figure 3 graphs the size of groups that each of the subjects in
T1, T2 and T3 joined prior to Round 2 of the game. To aid comparisons between
the treatments, relative frequencies are shown. A group size of one indicates that
the subject played Round 2 as a singleton, i.e., did not join a sharing group. Thus,
the bars on the far left of the ﬁgure indicate the proportions of subjects who did not
join groups under each of the treatments and correspond to the summary statistics
in Table 3. Only 31 percent of subjects did not join sharing groups under T1 as
compared to 59 and 64 percent under T2 and T3 respectively. A chi-squared test14
indicates that the likelihood of joining a group varies signiﬁcantly (1 percent level)
across treatments. Turning to group size, it is in T1 that we see the largest group,
a group of twelve. Groups of ten are a focal point due to the examples given during
the instruction of the subjects. We see groups of ten under both T1 and T2. It
is under T3 that group size is most restricted. No groups of more than eight were
formed under this treatment. These distributional diﬀerences are reﬂected in the
means reported in Table 3. Conditional upon joining a group, subjects under T1
and T2 formed groups with 6.89 and 6.50 members on average, whereas subjects
under T3 formed groups with only 3.97 members on average. Group size under T3
is signiﬁcantly (1 percent level) smaller than group size under T1 and T2 according
to t-tests.
Table 1 indicates that, despite the random assignment of villages to treatments,
there are some signiﬁcant diﬀerences in subject characteristics across treatments.
Heads of households rather than their spouses were more likely to be subjects under
T2 and the subject pool was slightly older as a result. Further, there was a greater
proportion of resettled villagers under T1 and T3 and a greater proportion of resi-
dents of Area 1 under the control, C, and T3. It is therefore important to examine
the robustness of these ﬁndings to controlling for these subject characteristics. To
this end, we conducted a series of regression analyses.
Table 4 presents the results of a probit analysis of whether subjects joined a group
and then a linear regression analysis of group size conditional on group membership.
In each case the standard errors are clustered at the village level.12 In the ﬁrst
two columns of the table, a dichotomous variable that takes the value one if a
subject joined a sharing group and zero otherwise is regressed on the following:
two treatment dummies (T1 is the basis for comparison); ﬁve dummies relating to
the choice of gamble that the subject made in Round 1 (Gamble A is the basis
for comparison), included to control for the subjects’ attitudes towards risk; the
subjects’ winnings from Round 1, included to control for wealth eﬀects; a dummy
distinguishing resettled villagers from non-resettled villagers; two dummies relating
to the geographical area within which the subjects’ villages fell (Area 1 is the base
for comparison); the number of households in the village, which corresponds to
the number of subjects attending the session; and the subjects’ sex, age, years of
education, marital status, and whether they head a household.
The Probit analyses conﬁrm that under both T2 and T3 subjects are signiﬁcantly
less likely to join a group than under T1. We see also that females, more educated
subjects and subjects in Area 2, which has the poorest soil and least reliable rainfall,
are more likely to join groups. Only the two treatment dummies survive a general
12To control for the potential interdependence of errors as group formation is a social process
within the villages.15
to speciﬁc process of elimination taking the ten percent level of signiﬁcance as a
cut-oﬀ.
When the size of the group that a subject joins is regressed on the same set of
explanatory variables only one of the treatment dummies, the one relating to T3,
is signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient on this dummy variable is also signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from that on the treatment dummy relating to T2. Here, several of the subjects
characteristics are signiﬁcant and survive the general to speciﬁc process of elimina-
tion. Subjects in resettled villages and villages in Area 2 form signiﬁcantly larger
groups, as do women and married subjects.
Choice of gamble. The subjects choice of gamble in Rounds 1 and 2 under
each of the treatments are presented in Table 3. According to chi-squared tests
the distribution of choices across gambles does not vary between treatments in
Round 1, but varies signiﬁcantly (one percent level) between treatments in Round
2. To see where these variations lie, turn to Figure 4 which depicts the cumulative
frequencies for the subjects’ choices of gamble under the diﬀerent treatments in
Round 2. The most striking feature of these plots is the greater tendency for
subjects under T1 to choose the riskier gambles. Over one quarter of the subjects
under T1 chose gambles E or F as compared to between 10 and 13 percent of
subjects under the other treatments. Further, only seven percent of subjects under
T1 chose gambles A or B as compared to between 14 and 17 percent of subjects
under the other treatments.
A more careful analysis of gamble choice under each of the treatments must take
account of each subject’s decision in Round 1, thereby allowing us to focus on the
extra risk that the subjects take on when pooling is an option. Figure 5 contains
four transition matrices, one for each of the treatments. The numbers within
the matrices are percentages. The ijth element of a matrix is the percentage of
the subjects who chose gamble i in Round 1 who went on to choose gamble j in
Round 2. The frequencies associated with the Round 1 choices are shown in the
columns to the right of the matrices. To facilitate easy reading of the matrices,
the cells have been shaded in accordance with the percentage they contain; darker
cells contain higher percentages. When the high percentages are concentrated
down the principle diagonal it indicates that subjects tended to choose the same
gamble in both rounds. When the high percentages are concentrated in the middle
two columns it indicates that the subjects tended towards the middle-of-the-range
gambles in Round 2 regardless of their choices in Round 1. If there are medium
to high percentages in the bottom left-hand corner of a matrix it indicates that
subjects tended to choose safer gambles in Round 2. And if there are medium
to high percentages in the top right-hand corner of a matrix it indicates that
subjects tended to choose riskier gambles in Round 2. The matrices for C, T2 and16
T3 display quite dominant principle diagonals combined, to varying degrees, with
dominant middle columns. The option to share risk under T2 and T3 appears not
to be causing subjects to choose riskier gambles. In contrast, the matrix for T1
is shaded in the top right-hand corner indicating that a considerable proportion
of subjects chose riskier gambles in Round 2. In Figure 6 the matrix for T1 is
further sub-divided into those who did not and did join groups (left and right-
hand matrices respectively). It is in the latter that we see the concentration in the
top right-hand corner.
Once again, we can use regression analysis to test the signiﬁcance of these regular-
ities in the data, while controlling for other factors that might have inﬂuenced the
subjects’ decisions. Here, we run ordered probit regressions to explain the choice
of gamble and present the results in Table 5. A positive coeﬃcient indicates that
an increase in that variable is associated with an increase in the riskiness of the
chosen gamble. In the ﬁrst column the subjects’ choices in Round 2 are regressed
on a set of ﬁve dummy variables indicating their choices of gamble in Round 1
(Gamble A is the base for comparison), their winnings from Round 1 to control
for wealth eﬀect, a set of three dummy variables indicating which treatment the
decision was made under (C is the base for comparison), and the nine individual
and village characteristics used previously in the analysis of group formation. All
standard errors are clustered at the village level.
The dummies relating to choice of gamble in Round 1 are jointly, highly signiﬁcant
(one percent level) and those who won more in Round 1 assume greater risk in
Round 2. The dummy identifying those who played under T1 bears a positive and
signiﬁcant (ﬁve percent level) coeﬃcient, indicating that they assumed more risk
than those in the control. In contrast, the dummy identifying those who played
under T2 bears a negative and signiﬁcant (ten percent level) coeﬃcient, indicating
that on average they assumed less risk than those in the control.
To investigate whether the eﬀects of the treatments work through group formation,
as Figure 6 suggested, in the second column we replace the three treatment dummy
variables with a set of six, three identifying those who chose to join a group under
each of the treatments and three identifying those who chose to play as singletons
under each treatment (C remains the base for comparison). The three dummies
relating to being in a group under T1, T2 or T3 are jointly signiﬁcant (ﬁve percent
level), while those relating to playing as singletons under each treatment are not.
A careful general to speciﬁc process yields the regression presented in the third
column of Table 5. In this regression, of the treatment-group dummies, only the
one identifying those who belonged to a group under T1 is signiﬁcant. The choices
made under T2 or T3 or by singletons under T1 were indistinguishable from those
made under C.17
5. Discussion of the results
In this section, we discuss the implications of the above experimental results for our
understanding of the context in which risk sharing agreements among villagers take
place. In particular, we focus on the importance of commitment and information
on defections and on the role of extrinsic incentives and intrinsic motivations.
That subjects are more likely to join risk sharing groups and to join larger groups
under T1 than under T2 and T3 suggests that exogenous extrinsic commitment is
valuable and that intrinsic motivations are not suﬃcient to guarantee the commit-
ment of all subjects. In other words, the loss of utility that individuals would suﬀer
due to feelings of guilt or denial of their underlying altruism were they to defect
on others are not always large enough to prevent defections. Moreover, the lower
level of risk sharing under T3 compared to T1 indicates that endogenous extrinsic
commitment based on the possibility of punishment between the subjects must be
either limited or costly or both.
What is a priori more surprising is that subjects form larger risk sharing groups
under T2 than T3. That the outcomes diﬀer under the two treatments suggests that
subjects do not fully share information on defections under T2 and that the greater
possibility of punishment under T3 is important. However, given that punishment
is easier under T3 than T2, we might expect that subjects would be more likely
to form groups and would form larger groups under T3 than T2, whereas what we
observe is the opposite. We suggest two possible explanations, one relating to the
cost of punishment and one to time-inconsistent preferences.
Costly Punishment. A ﬁrst possible explanation derives from recognizing that
punishment is not only costly to receive but may also be costly to inﬂict. If the
cost of punishing others is not insigniﬁcant (as would clearly be the case when the
punishment takes the form of exclusion from economic and social exchange) and if
the threat of punishment is not suﬃcient to ensure that punishment need only be
carried out rarely, subjects may prefer to enter into fewer agreements in the ﬁrst
place.13
To see this, consider the model outlined in Section 3. Given that harsher punish-
ment is possible in T3 than T2, we would expect that, if the same groups were
formed under each treatment, there would be fewer defections under T3 than T2.
The descriptive statistics on defections reported in Figure 2 are consistent with
this. However, this does not imply that forming a large risk sharing group is more
13Note that the cost of punishment to the punisher could be associated with its execution, the
risk of making an incorrect judgment and incurring social punishments oneself as a result, or
with some form of conﬂict aversion as discussed in Harowitz (2001)18
desirable under T3 than T2. In order for a group S to form, it must contain no
preferred subgroups, including singletons.
The cost of punishing defectors under T3 does not aﬀect the temptation to defect
in (3), but pushes the expected utility of being in a given group under T3 down.
This reduces the beneﬁts associated with joining a group or adding a member to
a group. In addition, if this discouragement is stronger for individuals with high
levels of intrinsic motivation g, this will be reﬂected in others’ expectations about
the likelihood of defections and thereby further reduce their willingness to join a
group.
This might explain why sharing groups are smaller under T3 than under T2. This
would be more likely to happen when intrinsic motivations (g) are suﬃcient to
stop people defecting at least some of the time under T2 and social sanctions (f)
are costly to inﬂict and not suﬃcient to discourage all defections. The following
example illustrates this idea.
Consider two individuals who are identical except, potentially, with respect to their
intrinsic motivations and who form a sharing group. Assume that there is only one
gamble that pays either y or ¯ y with probability 1/2, and denote as ym the average
payoﬀ
y+¯ y
2 . These individuals would consider defecting only after winning their
gamble, i.e. receiving ¯ y. Hence, γij(y) = αij(y) = 1 and, using symmetry, let
γ = γij(¯ y) and α = αij(¯ y) denote the probability that the other stays in the group
after winning his gamble under T2 and T3 respectively.
In this example, we can rewrite (2), the incentive constraint under T2 as
(5) gi ≥ e g ≡
1
2
(ui (¯ y) − ui (ym)).
Now assume that intrinsic motivations are private information and are distributed
according to a distribution Γ(g). Γ is common knowledge and characterizes in-
dividuals’ beliefs about the intrinsic motivations of the other. If all types of g
participate, then the probability, as assessed by i, that j will stay in the group
after winning is given by γ = 1 − Γ(e g). Let di be one if i stays in the group after
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Similarly, (3), the incentive constraint under T3, becomes
(6) gi ≥ b g ≡
1
2
(ui (¯ y) − ui (ym)) − f.19
Hence, if all types of gj participate then α ≡ 1 − Γ(b g) is i’s belief about the
probability that j will stay in the group after winning.
A quick comparison of (5) and (6) tells us that e g > b g so the probability of defection
is larger under T2 than T3, γ < α, as expected. However, due to the cost of
punishment the expected utility of being in a sharing group can be lower under





















where e 1i is one if i stays when winning and 0 otherwise.
If this expected utility is less than the utility of being a singleton, our two individ-
uals will prefer not to form a group under T3 while they may be happy to do so
under T2. Let’s take a numerical example.
Example 1 Consider a log utility function of consumption ln(c+k) where k = 100





ln(k + y) + ln(k + ¯ y)

= 5.576.
Assume that punishment costs the same amount to both the recipient and inﬂictor
f = c = 0.05. In this case, the threshold intrinsic motivations are e g = 0.173 and
b g = 0.123.
Take Γ to be a log normal distribution with parameter µ = 0 and σ = 10. Calcu-
lating the expected utilities we ﬁnd that
U
T2(ij) = 5.565 > Ui = 5.576 > U
T3(ij) = 5.557.
Hence, individuals form groups under T2 but not T3.
The same reasoning can be used to explain why a group of a given size may welcome
a new member under T2 but not under T3.
Time-inconsistent Preferences. Alternatively or in addition, issues of self-
control could help us interpret our ﬁndings. Individuals could have time-inconsistent
preferences in the form of hyperbolic discounting (see Laibson (1997) and O’Donoghue
and Rabin (1999) among others). Under T3, potential defectors know that they
will face the social sanctions later than they will experience the gain from the gam-
ble and their immediate feelings of guilt, should they choose to defect. Hence, it
is entirely possible that, on learning that she won her gamble, she would discount
future sanctions more heavily compared to her winnings, than she would ex-ante,
i.e., at the time of forming a group. In this case, the punishment f that enters her
incentive constraint (3) is lower than the value of the punishment e f that enters her
expected utility.20
Now consider the previous example with two individuals and one gamble choice.
The incentive constraint in (6) determines the likelihood that the other defects if
all types participate as α ≡ 1 − Γ(b g). However, the same individual may view the
situation diﬀerently ex-ante. If social sanctions represent a punishment of e f > f




(ui (¯ y) − ui (ym)) − e f.
is the value of intrinsic motivations above which an individual would ex-ante rather
not defect.
Since g < e g, individuals with intrinsic motivation gi between g and e g prefer not
to defect but would defect all the same. If the diﬀerence is large, then these
individuals may prefer not to join a group rather than join and then defect. In
this case, choosing not to form risk sharing groups could, using Elster’s (1984)
terminology, be a form of pre-commitment. These participation decisions will be
reﬂected in α which will increase accordingly. Note that this aﬀects subjects who
would defect if they joined a group and so further reduces the observed defection
rate under T3. So once again, participation in sharing groups can be lower when
social sanctions are possible.
In future work it would be interesting to distinguish between these two explana-
tions – costly punishment and time-inconsistency. Depending on when winning
becomes salient (and the relative discounting between the gamble gain and the
future sanctions changes), one could compare the behavior of individuals asked
whether they want to opt out just after learning that they had won their gamble
(as is the case in this experiment) with that of individuals asked some time earlier
whether they will opt out contingent on winning or loosing their gamble. A diﬀer-
ence in behavior would be a sign of time-inconsistency. New experimental designs
could also help us directly identify the eﬀects of the costs of punishment to both
the punisher and the recipient. However, for these experiments to be truly infor-
mative they would need to be preceded by a careful investigation into the forms
that such punishments take in everyday life.
6. Comparison with real risk sharing networks
An interesting question is whether subjects who join the same group in our exper-
iment share risk with each other in real life. A comparison of the groups formed
within our experiment with real life risk sharing networks would shed some light
on the external validity of our experiment.14
14For other examples of similar investigations into the external validity of behavioral experiments
conducted in the ﬁeld, see Karlan (2005) and Schechter (2007).21
We are able to do precisely this for part of our sample. At the same time that
we were in the ﬁeld, Dekker (2002) was conducting an in-depth study of ﬂows of
assistance between households in ﬁve of the 23 villages involved in our experiment.
Those villages were Moturamhepo, Zvataida, and Mudzinge, Muringamombe, and
Pedzanhamo. Dekker asked every household head or senior woman in these villages
to name the households in their village to whom they had given assistance and from
whom they had received assistance during the preceding twelve months. We use
these survey data to investigate whether the groups formed during the experiment
bear any resemblance to the real risk sharing networks within these ﬁve villages.
From the survey data, we construct two relational matrices for each village charac-
terizing the risk sharing network among the subjects of our experiment (a subset
of the villagers). In the ‘assistance given’ matrix for a particular village, the ijth
takes the value one if household i reported giving assistance to household j 6= i
or vice versa, one if i = j and zero otherwise. Similarly, the ijth element in the
‘assistance received’ matrix for a particular village takes the value one if household
i reported receiving assistance from household j 6= i or vice versa, one for the
diagonal elements and zero otherwise. With no measurement error these matrices
should be the transpose of each other. However, this is not the case and, consistent
with there being a stigma associated with needing or receiving assistance and/or
high status associate with giving assistance, the ‘assistance given’ matrices indicate
more relations than the ‘assistance received’ matrices, i.e., there are many more
ones in the former than in the latter. For this reason, and because there is no way
of telling which of the two matrices is a better reﬂection of the actual pattern of
transfers, we repeat the analysis described below twice for each village, once using
the ‘assistance received’ matrix, and once using the ‘assistance given’ matrix.
Next, for each of the ﬁve villages, we construct another matrix representing the
group formation within the experiment. In these matrices the ijth element takes
the value one if the representative from household i in the experiment was in the
same group as the representative from household j, and zero otherwise.
We are interested in whether the experimental group formation matrices are related
to the ‘assistance given’ and ‘assistance received’ matrices. In other words, we want
to know whether the likelihood of two experimental subjects from the same village
joining the same risk sharing group is related to whether they have given or received
assistance from one another in the past.
Tests for this relationship cannot be based on standard correlations between the
elements of each experimental group formation matrix and its corresponding ‘assis-
tance given’ and ‘assistance received’ matrices. This is because we cannot assume
that the elements within the matrices are independent of one another as each ma-
trix represents a fully enumerated and interrelated social system. Instead, we use22
the Quadratic Assignment Procedure – a non-parametric procedure commonly used
in social network analysis (see Krackhardt (1987)) – to measure the network cor-
relation between our matrices. We repeat the following procedure for each village.
First, we compute a match score m for the experimental group formation matrix
and one of the survey network matrices, either the ‘assistance given’ or ‘assistance
received’ matrix, by counting the number of times that the corresponding cells in
the two matrices are the same, i.e., both equal one or both equal zero.15 This
provides us with a matrix-pair-speciﬁc match score. Second, we simulate 10,000
permutations of one of the two matrices, say the experimental group formation ma-
trix, by randomly but synchronously permutating its rows and columns. In each
permutation, the order of the rows of the original matrix is randomly reshuﬄed and
then the columns are placed in that same order.16 In essence, such permutations
preserve the network structure but randomize the subjects’ locations in the net-
work. For each of the simulated matrices indexed by π = 1,...T where T = 10,000,
we compute the match score mπ exactly as we did for the original matrix. Third,
we calculate P as twice the proportion of simulated matrices with a higher match
score, that is so that mπ > m.17 If less than ten percent of the randomized matches
have a higher match score than the actual matrix, P < 0.1, we conclude that the
matrices are related with a ‘signiﬁcance level’ equal to P.
The signiﬁcance levels P, for the ﬁve villages for which we have data and for both
the ‘assistance given’ and the ‘assistance received’ matrices, are reported in Table
6.18 We see that in three out of the ﬁve villages, Moturamhepo, Zvataida, and
Mudzinge, the match between group formation in the game and patterns of assis-
tance reported as given is signiﬁcant. For one of the other villages, Muringamombe,
the match between group formation in the game and patterns of assistance reported
as received is signiﬁcant. For the ﬁfth village, Pedzanhamo, neither match is sig-
niﬁcant.
These results are particularly encouraging given the fact that these tests are subject
to two sources of bias both of which may suppress the signiﬁcance level deﬁned
15Diagonal entries are ignored.
16After the permutation, the following is true. For each row, the ﬁrst subscript is shared by
all the entries in the row. For each column, the second subscript is shared. And each diagonal
element moves to a new position but remains a diagonal element.
17If the experimental group formation matrix and the survey network matrices were uncorrelated,
we would expect around 50% of the simulated matrices to have a higher match score. Hence,
by looking at twice the proportion of simulated matrices with a higher match score, we would
expect P to be around 100% for uncorrelated matrices.
18These tests were performed using UCINET, a social network analysis software. We only present
signiﬁcance levels as the match statistics themselves are not comparable across villages and have
no meaning beyond the context of the tests. The match statistics are available from the authors
upon request.23
above. First, in the survey data an actual ﬂow of assistance is observed only if
one household is in need and another is both willing and able to respond, whereas
in the experiment only the condition of willingness must be met in order for two
subjects to become linked by group membership. Hence, the survey data captures
ex post ﬂows of assistance while the experimental data captures ex ante agreements
relating to ﬂows of assistance if unequal payoﬀs arise. Thus, the experimental group
matrices are likely to contain many more relations than either of the ‘assistance’
matrices and the match statistic is likely to be suppressed as a result. This bias
is likely to be greater when the less dense assistance received matrices are being
used. So, we expect more signiﬁcant results in the tests involving the ‘assistance
given’ matrices. The second potential source of bias arises if the subjects in the
experiment and those making real risk sharing decisions are distinct. The majority
of the experimental subjects were household heads or senior women who would
have been involved in real risk sharing decisions. However, in Pedzanhamo a
large proportion of the experimental subjects were young dependents rather than
senior household members. Here, once again we expect to see suppressed levels of
signiﬁcance.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we use a framed ﬁeld experiment to test the implications of limited
commitment and punishment possibilities in a risk sharing game. We ﬁnd that
subjects engage in more risk sharing and risk taking when provided with a full
commitment technology as in Treatment 1 (T1). This suggests that a lack of
commitment limits the risk sharing agreements that these villagers can form in
real life. We also ﬁnd that, when commitment is limited, more risk sharing takes
place under asymmetric information on defections as in Treatment 2 (T2) than
when defections are public as in Treatment 3 (T3). That substantial risk sharing
takes place under Treatment 2 (T2) suggests that intrinsic motivations such as
altruism, guilt, etc. do play an important role in risk sharing agreements. Further,
that risk sharing is limited under Treatment 3 (T3) suggests that social sanctions
are limited as a basis for commitment. However, that less risk sharing occurs
under Treatment 3 (T3) than Treatment 2 (T2) is surprising since it is easier to
punish defectors when there is symmetric information on defections. We provide
two possible explanations for this result. First, individuals may suﬀer from time-
inconsistent preferences. Upon receiving a high gamble payoﬀ they may be tempted
and discount future sanctions too heavily (from their ex-ante perspective). In this
case not participating in a sharing group is a way to avoid the temptation to
defect. Second, social sanctions are not only costly to receive but also often costly
to administer. Hence, although social sanctions reduce the likelihood of defection,24
it is entirely possible that individuals would prefer not to form sharing groups or
to form smaller ones under Treatment 3 (T3) than Treatment 2 (T2).25
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Table 1: Subject characteristics  
Subjects in 




Round 2    
C
Subjects in 
Round 2    
T1
Subjects in 
Round 2    
T2
Subjects in 





Number of subjects 640 642 86 216 157 183 2108-2128
Females 47% 48% 55% 50% 41% 48% 54%
Married 69% 69% 62% 68% 73% 70% 57%
Household head
# 42% 40% 28% 37% 56% 37% 19%
Spouse of head
## 21% 22% 24% 22% 15% 26% 18%
Age in years
### 42 42 39 40 44 42 35
Education in years 7777777
Resettled
# 83% 83% 79% 89% 71% 88% 79%
Area of residency
#
                     Area 1 38% 38% 43% 37% 32% 43% 57%
                     Area 2 34% 34% 36% 26% 43% 37% 22%
                     Area 3 28% 27% 20% 37% 25% 21% 20%  
Notes: C = control, subjects play solo; T1 = group formation with full commitment; T2 = group 
formation with private defection possible; T3 = group formation with public defection possible.  
# - variation across treatments significant at 1% level (Chi-squared test); ## - variation across 
treatments significant at 10% level (Chi-squared test); ### - variation across treatments significant at 
10% level (linear regression of age on 3 treatment dummies). #### Data from the Zimbabwe Rural 
Household Income Dynamics Survey, 2001; over 15 year olds only. 
 
 
Table 2: The gamble choice game: payoffs, expected values, 
variances, and corresponding levels of risk aversion 
Gamble 
Choice
High payoff     
on blue 
background
Low payoff     
on yellow 
background




Risk aversion range 
(CRRA)
Gamble A 100 100 100 0 infinity to 7.51
Gamble B 190 90 140 50 7.51 to 1.74
Gamble C 240 80 160 80 1.74 to 0.81
Gamble D 300 60 180 120 0.81 to 0.32
Gamble E 380 20 200 180 0.32 to 0.00
Gamble F 400 0 200 200 0 to -ve infinity
 
Notes: Gamble A is the least risky but has the lowest expected value. Gamble F is the most risky but 
has the joint (with gamble E) highest expected value. 
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Table 3: Summary of experimental data 
Treatment C T1 T2 T3 All
Number of subjects  86 216 157 183 642
Group joining: proportion who
   joined groups for Round 2
# - 68.98% 40.76% 36.07% 50.18%
   played solo in Round 2
# - 31.02% 59.24% 63.93% 49.82%
Mean size of group joined:   -
   unconditional
## - 5.06 3.24 2.07 3.56
   conditional upon joining a group
### - 6.89 6.50 3.97 6.11
Gamble choices in Round 1:
 Gamble A 1 1 %8 %1 2 % 1 2 % 1 0 %
 Gamble B 17% 11% 13% 15% 13%
 Gamble C 28% 37% 26% 32% 32%
 Gamble D 33% 35% 37% 32% 35%
 Gamble E 2% 6% 5% 5% 5%
 Gamble F 8% 4% 6% 3% 5%
Gamble choices in Round 2:
#
 Gamble A 1% 2% 3% 8% 4%
 Gamble B 1 3 %5 %1 1 % 1 0 %9 %
 Gamble C 31% 35% 44% 38% 38%
 Gamble D 42% 31% 32% 32% 33%
 Gamble E 12% 14% 5% 9% 10%
 Gamble F 1% 13% 4% 3% 6%
Winnings in round 1 $147 $165 $161 $152 $158
Winnings in round 2 $175 $177 $163 $173 $172
 
Notes: C = control; T1 = full commitment; T2 = private defection; T3 = public defection.  
Gambles A to F are ordered by increasing risk and expected value.  
# - variation across treatments significant at 1% level (Chi-squared test); ## - all pair wise differences in 
means significant at 1% level (t-tests with equal variance assumed); ### - significantly lower (at 1% 
level) mean under T4 than under T2 and T3 (t-tests with equal variance assumed). 30       
 
 
Table 4: Group membership and group size 
Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.
Constant 0.058 0.820 0.495 0.173 *** 2.687 1.348 * 3.348 0.830 ***
T2 -0.729 0.404 * -0.729 0.395 * -0.431 0.685 -0.359 0.782
T3 -0.858 0.205 *** -0.852 0.217 *** -3.321 0.704 *** -3.122 0.660 ***
Gamble choice in round 1
#
Gamble B 0.271 0.223 0.124 0.555
Gamble C -0.084 0.236 0.017 0.642
Gamble D 0.171 0.244 0.460 0.586
Gamble E 0.326 0.414 1.103 0.950
Gamble F 0.051 0.356 0.513 0.947
Winnings in round 1 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001
Resettled 0.009 0.352 1.143 0.510 ** 0.978 0.531 *
Area 2 0.523 0.265 ** 1.868 0.656 *** 2.059 0.693 ***
Area 3 0.315 0.297 0.453 0.674 0.643 0.693
H'holds in village -0.006 0.013 0.024 0.028
Female 0.375 0.212 * 1.782 0.595 *** 1.811 0.559 ***
Age in years 0.003 0.005 -0.004 0.010
Education in years 0.032 0.019 * -0.026 0.073
Married -0.077 0.137 1.118 0.385 *** 1.150 0.341 ***
Household head -0.036 0.192 -0.086 0.411
Joint significance of 
round 1 choice
## 0.197 0.444
Joint significance of 
areas
## 0.141 0.034 0.026
R
2 0.108 0.067 0.406 0.396
Obs. 532 556 274 279
Probit of group formation Group size conditional on formation
 
Notes: The dependent variable in the Probit regressions is a dummy that takes on value one if a subject is 
in a group and zero otherwise. The regressions for group size conditional on joining a group are linear.  
Only treatments where group formation is possible were considered.   
T1 = full commitment; T2 = private defection; T3 = public defection.  
# Gambles A to F are ordered by increasing risk and expected value.  
The reported standard errors are clustered at the villages/sessions level.  
* coefficient significant at 10% level, ** coefficient significant at 5% level, *** coefficient significant at 
1% level.  
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Table 5: Choice of gamble in Round 2 
Dependent variable = Gamble choice in Round 2 in an ordered probit: Gamble A is given a 
value of 1, gamble B a value of 2, etc. 
Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.
Gamble choice in round 1
#
Gamble B -0.084 0.182 -0.087 0.176 -0.092 0.170
Gamble C -0.216 0.173 -0.214 0.161 -0.218 0.163
Gamble D -0.264 0.188 -0.275 0.180 -0.283 0.182
Gamble E 0.462 0.184 ** 0.472 0.180 *** 0.486 0.183 ***
Gamble F 0.248 0.318 0.244 0.309 0.234 0.322
Winnings in round 1 0.002 0.000 *** 0.002 0.000 *** 0.002 0.000 ***
T1 0.281 0.120 **
T2 -0.238 0.129 *
T3 -0.201 0.135
T1 &  in group 0.416 0.226 * 0.521 0.237 **
T2 &  in group -0.272 0.144 * -0.162 0.118
T3 &  in group -0.206 0.252 -0.117 0.235
T1 & not in a group -0.002 0.156
T2 & not in a group -0.213 0.173
T3 & not in a group -0.196 0.102 *
Resettled 0.107 0.110 0.080 0.107
Area 2 -0.164 0.097 * -0.191 0.112 *
Area 3 -0.075 0.180 -0.118 0.182
Households in village 0.001 0.006 0.000 0.006
Female -0.120 0.112 -0.123 0.099 -0.160 0.088 *
Age in years 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.005
Education in years 0.020 0.018 0.018 0.018
Married 0.049 0.119 0.053 0.115
Household head 0.081 0.113 0.086 0.116
Ordered probit constant 1 -1.519 0.343 -1.595 0.319 -1.686 0.210
Ordered probit constant 2 -0.829 0.341 -0.902 0.322 -0.999 0.183
Ordered probit constant 3 0.392 0.314 0.319 0.298 0.213 0.154
Ordered probit constant 4 1.448 0.305 1.383 0.298 1.268 0.169
Ordered probit constant 5 2.040 0.344 1.985 0.330 1.868 0.228
Joint sig of game 1 choice
## 0.000 0.000 0.000
Joint sig of treatment 
dummies
## 0.001
Joint sig of treatment & "in a 
group" dummies
## 0.049 0.027
Joint sig of treatment & "not in 
a group" dummies
## 0.204
Joint sig of area dummies
## 0.237 0.215
Pseudo R
2 0.046 0.050 0.045
Obs. 618 618 618
 
Notes: C = control; T1 = full commitment; T2 = private defection; T3 = public defection.  
Gambles A to F are ordered by increasing risk and expected value.  
Reported standard errors are clustered at the villages/sessions level.  
* coefficient significant at 10% level, ** coefficient significant at 5% level, *** coefficient 
significant at 1% level.  
## P-value reported for joint significance of set of dummy variables. 
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Table 6: Correlations between experimental and real 
risk pooling networks  
 
Village
reported assistance          
given 







Significance of match between group formation and…
 
Notes: Table reports P-values or significance levels in percentage form. The P-values 
relate to a series of non-parametric tests of the hypothesis that the groups that subjects 
form within the games bear some relation to the assistance networks they maintain in real 
life. Two tests were performed for each of the five named villages, one using the data on 
reported assistance given and one using the data on reported assistance received. 
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Figure 2: Limited commitment and renegades  
in Treatments T2 and T3 
 
Joined groups under T2
64
low payoff high payoff
32 32
stay in opt out stay in opt out
32 0 25 (78%) 7 (22%)
Joined groups under T3
66
low payoff high payoff
32 34
stay in opt out stay in opt out




Notes: T2 = group formation with private defection; T3 = group formation with public defection.   35     
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Notes: Only treatments where group formation is possible were considered.   
T1 = full commitment; T2 = private defection; T3 = public defection.  
A group size of 1 implies that the subject has either chosen to or has not been accepted into a group and 
was, thus, required to play solo in the second round. 36       







































Notes: C = control; T1 = full commitment; T2 = private defection; T3 = public defection.  
Gambles A to F are ordered by increasing risk and expected value.  
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Figure 5: Comparison of gambles chosen in first and second rounds 
CT 1
A B C D E F Subs. A B C D E F Subs.
A 0 20 20 40 20 0 10 A 18 12 12 18 12 29 17
B 0 13 27 53 7 0 15 B 0 0 41 27 14 18 22
C 0 8 42 46 4 0 24 C 1 6 40 31 13 9 80
D 3 14 31 34 14 3 29 D 1 4 37 37 14 7 73
E 0 0 0 5 05 0 0 2 E 0 0 2 03 03 02 0 1 0
F 0 17 33 33 17 0 6 F 0 0 0 38 13 50 8
T2 T3
A B C D E F Subs. A B C D E F Subs.
A0 65 0 2 861 1 1 8 A 2 0 1 0 1 5 4 55 5 2 0
B 5 19 38 29 5 5 21 B 8 16 24 40 8 4 25
C 0 10 51 36 3 0 39 C 4 4 53 28 7 5 57
D 5 16 39 30 5 4 56 D 6 13 43 28 11 0 54
E 0 0 3 83 81 31 3 8 E 0 0 2 06 02 0 0 1 0
F 11 0 33 33 11 11 9 F 0 20 40 20 0 20 5
Gamble choice in round 2























































































Notes: Gambles A to F are ordered by increasing risk and expected value.  
The numbers within the matrices are percentages. The ij
th element of a matrix is the percentage of those 
subjects who chose gamble i in the first round who went on to choose gamble j in the second round. The 
frequencies associated with the first round choices are shown in the columns to the right of the matrices. 
The cells of the matrices have been shaded in accordance with the percentage they contain; darker cells 
contain higher percentages.  
 
Figure 6: Comparison of gambles chosen in first round and second 
round under Treatment 2 
     T1 not in groups     T1 in groups
A B C D E F Subs. A B C D E F Subs.
A 33 0 17 33 0 17 6 A 9 18 9 9 18 36 11
B 0 0 5 74 3 0 0 7 B 0 0 3 32 02 02 7 1 5
C0 4 4 83 31 5 0 2 7 C2 8 3 63 01 11 3 5 3
D6 6 2 85 01 1 0 1 8 D0 4 4 03 31 5 9 5 5
E0 05 0 2 502 5 4 E0 0 03 3 5 0 1 7 6
F 0 0 0 50 0 50 2 F 0 0 0 33 17 50 6













































Notes: Gambles A to F are ordered by increasing risk and expected value.  
The numbers within the matrices are percentages. The ij
th element of a matrix is the percentage of those 
subjects who chose gamble i in the first round who went on to choose gamble j in the second round. The 
frequencies associated with the first round choices are shown in the columns to the right of the matrices. 
The cells of the matrices have been shaded in accordance with the percentage they contain; darker cells 
contain higher percentages.  
 